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Abstract  
2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article argues 
that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties binding 
together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political lessons from 
developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. First, emulation 
of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP launched in 1981. 
Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to retain power twice in 
1993 and 2009. Since 1993, DP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder for UMNO to be in alert 
mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again ousted from power in 2009, 
UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the unprecedented setback it 
suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, although LDP’s reversal of 
fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1999, the 
analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large extent, 
flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogising between different situations 
which at a glance seem to be comparable. 
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THE MISCONCEPTION OF POLITICAL LESSONS: HOW UMNO PERCEIVES 
THE FALL OF LDP IN JAPAN 
 
                Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail♣  
              Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid∗ 
 
 
Santayana’s aphorism must be reversed: too often it is those who can remember the 
past who are condemned to repeat it. 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr1 
 
       ABSTRACT 
2012 marks the thirtieth anniversary of Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP). This article 
argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is stimulated by symbiotic ties 
binding together both countries’ respective major political parties, viz. the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). UMNO, especially 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), derived political 
lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. Two forms of lessons may be discerned. 
First, emulation of Japan’s success in economic development, which become the basis of LEP 
launched in 1981. Second, on which our article focuses, lessons from the failure of LDP to 
retain power twice in 1993 and 2009. Since 1993,  LDP’s defeat has been a poignant reminder 
for UMNO to be in alert mode in facing any electoral possibility. When LDP was again 
                                                          
♣ Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail, Ph.D. is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Centre of History, Politics 
and Strategy, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Malaysia. He expresses gratitude to sponsors of 
this research: the Sumitomo Foundation, Japan and Young Researcher Fellowship Scheme, UKM. He would also 
like to acknowledge the support of Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO) Japan for providing him 
opportunity as a visiting researcher from October to November 2012. 
∗Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Distance 
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Institute of Developing Economies (IDE)-JETRO, Japan, and Soda Naoki of the Tokyo University of Foreign 
Studies (TUFS), for engaging in stimulating discussions towards the preparation of this article. Any remaining 
errors and omissions are wholly the responsibility of the authors. 
1  Quoted in Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the past: The Use and Misuse of History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 179. 
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ousted from power in 2009, UMNO was a most psychologically affected party owing to the 
unprecedented setback it suffered at Malaysia’s Twelfth General Elections (GE) of 2008. Yet, 
although LDP’s reversal of fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to 
its trajectory since 1999, the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO 
leaders were, to a large extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in 
analogising between different situations which at a glance seem to be comparable. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of Malaysia’s 12th General Elections (GE) of 2008, which saw the 
ruling National Front (BN: Barisan Nasional) coalition dispossessed of its dignified two-
thirds parliamentary majority and conceding defeat in five states to a hastily assembled 
People’s Pact (PR: Pakatan Rakyat) coalition, a quote frequently employed by leaders and 
supporters of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is Spanish-American 
philosopher George Santayana’s remark: ‘Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it’.2 Ironically, in that very same year of BN’s most disastrous electoral 
performance, a group of scholars studying dominant party systems had reminded parties like 
UMNO that the primary challenge confronting them lies in their willingness of ‘learning to 
lose’.3 Although BN still won the 12th GE, and despite the fact that the majority Malay-
Muslim support for UMNO remained strong, 4  instantaneous reaction from conservative 
UMNO quarters such as former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, known to be obsessed 
                                                          
2  Cf. Najib Razak, ‘Junjung tradisi, zahir perubahan’, Utusan Malaysia, 16 October 2009; Mahathir Mohamad, 
‘Democracy in Political Parties’, 23 November 2009, http://chedet.co.cc/chedetblog/2009/11/democracy-in-
political-parties.html (accessed 12 June 2010). 
3 Diane K. Mauzy and Shane J. Barter, ‘Learning to lose? Not if UMNO can help it’, in Edward Friedman and 
Joseph Wong (eds.), Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose (London: Routledge, 
2008), 211. 
4  Edmund Terence Gomez, ‘Umno still strong in Malay heartland’, Malaysiakini, 4 June 2008, 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/83920 (accessed 22 July 2012). 
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with retention of the symbolic two-thirds majority, appeared to indicate the onset of a 
previously unheard of defeatist mentality within UMNO.  
Hence, this article looks at UMNO’s application of political lessons derived from the 
downfall of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan on 30 August 2009, in the wake of 
Malaysia’s changed political scenario following the disastrous results befalling UMNO and 
BN in March 2008. LDP’s loss of the reins of government slightly a year after Malaysia’s 
12th GE, at a time when UMNO was struggling to rehabilitate itself, greatly affected the 
present crop of UMNO leaders. Throughout 2010 and 2011, UMNO President-cum-Prime 
Minister Najib Razak repeatedly reminded UMNO to take heed of LDP’s fall from power. 
UMNO also invited former LDP politician who defected to the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), Tamura Katoro, to share his experience on LDP’s change of fortune. In his meeting 
with Yukio Hatoyama, Japanese Prime Minister from DPJ, in January 2010, Najib also 
broached the question of factors contributing to LDP’s defeat to his counterpart. 
Our discussion is divided into three parts. The first part elaborates the concept of 
‘political lesson’ or also known as ‘analogical reasoning’. The second part deals with relevant 
comparisons between UMNO and LDP, exploring how the good relationship between 
Malaysia and Jepun had been boosted at the dominant party level. Finally, the most important 
part of this article deals with how UMNO perceives LDP’s downfall since 1993. We look in 
particular at how UMNO leaders and members utilised analogical reasoning in an effort to 
contextualise UMNO’s present predicament. 
 
POLITICAL LEARNING AND POLITICAL LESSONS 
Political learning is defined by Nancy Bermeo as ‘the process through which people 
modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic 
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changes in the environment’. According to her, ‘crises often force people to reevaluate the 
ideas that they have used as guides to action in the past’.5 Within this context, UMNO as a 
comparable entity is seen as being in crisis mode after the 12th GE. In its self-introspection, 
UMNO is compelled to refer to the vicissitude of LDP, also arguably in crisis mode, 
following its defeat in 2009. 
International relations scholars in the United States of America (USA) developed the 
concept of political lessons in their research into how American decision makers learned from 
history in framing contemporary and future policies. Two path-breaking works in this 
direction are the studies by Ernest May6 and by Robert Jervis.7 To May, Jervis and other 
researchers, a consensus has emerged that international history serves as the most vital 
resource for the powers that be. Thus, policy makers are often influenced by history and 
frequently resort to analogical deduction from past events in projecting and devising present 
and future programmes. Usually, however, such historical application and analogical 
reasoning have been subject to shallow contextual usage, poorly chosen methodology and 
overgeneralisation. The limited context in which such applications operate is evidenced by 
their practitioner’s tendency to confine their analyses to images and facts acquired at first 
impression. 8  Such a myopic inclination often drives decision makers to formulate faulty 
hypotheses, due to inadequate information to interpret factual happenings in the real world.9 
But when do the decision makers then apply political lessons? Scholars generally treat 
‘perceived lessons of the past’ as assuming more significance in critical or novel situations for 
                                                          
5 Nancy Bermeo, ‘Democracy and Lessons of Dictatorship’, Comparative Politics, 24, no.3 (1992), p. 274. 
6  May, “Lessons” of the past: The Use and Misuse of History. 
7 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1976). 
8 See also David H. Petraeus, ‘Lesson of History and Lessons of Vietnam’, Parameter, XVI, 3, (1986), p. 44; 
Khong Y.F, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decisions of 1965 (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), p.12. 
9  May, “Lessons” of the past: The Use and Misuse of History, especially Preface and chapter VII; Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chapter 6, especially pp. 217-218 and 281-282. 
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which there is lack of precedence. 10  Within this context, the denial of BN’s two-thirds 
majority in 2008 could be regarded as unprecedented for UMNO as the ruling party. The most 
important question however is: Can the application of political lessons, hitherto 
overwhelmingly applied by American scholars to fit American experiences, be judiciously 
undertaken in different national and political party contexts i.e. that of UMNO and LDP? As 
May argues, ‘examples from other countries could also be cited’ as a source of learning.11 
Research by Zimmerman and Axelrod for example analyses how the Soviet Union regime 
heeded lessons of the Vietnam War in investigating its foreign policy. To them, ‘one’s 
perception can be influenced by one’s experience.’ 12  Based on such precedence, we are 
therefore of the view that a nation state’s political and historical developments may not only 
become lessons for decision makers of that particular country, but can also be benefited by 
policy makers from other states. 
 
UMNO AND LDP: A NEGLECTED MODEL OF COMPARISON 
In the context of political lessons, analogy is ‘a comparison between one thing and 
another, where two things are held to exhibit structural similiraties in some or all of their 
properties’.13 This definition is directly relevant in depicting UMNO and LDP as a neglected 
model of comparison in analyses of dominant parties. On why such a comparison has hitherto 
been marginal might owe to the differential fact that LDP operates within a democratic Japan, 
while UMNO exists within Malaysia’s semi-democratic paradigm. Researchers have thus 
been more comfortable comparing Japan with other ‘uncommon democracies’ such as 
                                                          
10 Houghton, D. P, ‘The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 26, no. 4 (1996), p. 525; Petraeus, ‘Lesson of History and Lessons of Vietnam’, p. 44. 
11 May, “Lessons” of the past: The Use and Misuse of History, p. x. 
12 William Zimmerman and Robert Axelrod, The “lessons’ of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy, World Politics, 
34, no. 1 (1981), p. 2. 
13  Houghton, ‘The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations’, p. 524. 
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Sweden, Italy, Israel and Germany.14 Malaysian parties, on the other hand, are levelled at par 
with parties of other semi-democratic regimes, such as that of the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) in Singapore.15 We nonetheless prefer argument that the logic of comparing political 
systems does not necessitate that subjects be of the same class. 16 Available literature on 
dominant party systems has numerously classified dominant parties into narrower sub-types. 
Some scholars adopt the view that such categorisation restricts ‘comparative imagination’17 
and is potentially conducive to conceptual confusion.18 Following Pempel,19 we regard both 
UMNO and LDP as ‘dominant conservative regimes’ i.e. regimes that have ruled for such a 
prolonged period that conservatism as an ideology has been been firmly institutionalised in 
their political practices. Herein lies the underlying theme of this article: studying the 
interaction between reformism and conservatism in two dominant conservative regimes 
currently undergoing reform fatigue. 
For analytical purposes, let us highlight a few similarities between both parties. First, 
both parties were founded by the same generation of political leaders. LDP was established in 
1955 whereas UMNO, though founded nine years earlier, entered the domestic electoral fray 
in 1955. Second, both parties are heritage parties, which in UMNO’s case is served by its 
position as the party that fought for national independence. Third, both parties drove the 
                                                          14  Cf. T.J. Pempel (ed.), Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990). 
15 Cf. Dan Slater, ‘Strong-state Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore’, Journal of Democracy, 23, no. 2 
(2012), pp. 19-33. 
16 E. Gene De Felice, ‘Comparison Misconceived: Common Nonsense in Comparative Politics’, Comparative 
Politics, 13, no. 1 (1980), pp. 123-124. 
17 Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong, ‘Dominant parties, dominant party systems, and their transitions’, in 
Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong (eds.), Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose 
(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 2-4. 
18 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.13-14. 
19 T. J. Pempel, ‘Learning to lose is for losers: The Japanese LDP’s reform struggle’, in Edward Friedman and 
Joseph Wong (eds.), Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose (London: Routledge, 
2008), p. 111. 
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nation state along the developmental state orientation. 20  Fourth, both parties were at the 
commanding heights of nation states well-known for an Asian-style democracy which 
emphasised stability, continuity and consensus – elements which later formed bases for the 
Asian Values discourse popularised in the mid-1980s by both parties’ leaders.  
Fifth, both parties, in holding power for relatively lengthy durations, had successfully 
forged ‘epochs’, whose traits are as outlined by Maurice Duverger.21 In other words, it would 
be quite out of place to discuss Japan vis-à-vis Malaysia without mentioning the role of LDP 
and UMNO. Sixth, as stressed by Manjit Bhatia; ‘Both Malaysia and Japan are in essence 
one-party states [in which] structures and institutions of patron-client relations are entrenched, 
with all the accouterments of factionalism, machine politics, corruption, cronyism, nepotism, 
patrimonialism, populism, fictive kinship and brokerage’.22 The major influence upon such 
conditions is the nexus connecting politics and business. The involvement of business 
concerns in Japanese politics is crucial to the formation of the iron triangle between LDP 
politicians-bureacracy and vested interests.23 UMNO, on its part, controls business activities 
directly or indirectly via various corporate asset management techniques. This is among the 
most significant parallels available to both UMNO and LDP through intricate interlocking 
mechanisms between business and politics.24 
                                                          
20 For the case of Japan, see Chalmers Johnson, ‘The Developmental State: Odyssey of a concept’, in Meredith 
Woo-Cumings (ed), The Developmental State (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 32-60. For 
Malaysia, see Abdul Rahman Embong, ‘Developmentalist State in Malaysia: Its Origin, Nature and 
Contemporary Transformation’ in Joan M. Nelson, Jacob Meerman dan Abdul Rahman Embong (eds.), 
Globalization & National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies & IKMAS, 2008), pp. 27-58. 
21 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons Inc, 1963), pp. 308-309. 
22  Manjit Bhatia, ‘Malaysia's new premier: Altered stakes’, 13 November 2003, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EK13Ae06.html (accessed 23 August 2012). 
23 Cf. Richard Colignon and Chikako Usui, ‘The Resilience of Japan’s Iron Triangle’, Asian Survey, 41, no. 5 
(2001), pp. 865-895. 
24 Cf. Jomo K.S., quoted in ‘Can Anyone Save Malaysia?’, Asiaweek, 28 August 1998, p. 23; Khoo Boo Teik, 
‘The Real Threat To Malaysia's Stability’, Asian Wall Street Journal, 18 November 1999, 
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Along similar lines, in administering the state, both UMNO and LDP work hand in 
glove with a powerful burueaucracy friendly to the ruling party. Such understanding is based 
on the presumption that it is advisable to harmonise relations between government and big 
business in a non-antagonistic way. Malaysia, for instance, established the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) as a mirror of its powerful counterpart in Japan. 
Existence of Malaysia Inc. and Japan Inc., regardless of orientational differences between 
their structures,25 renders both political systems susceptible to problems of inertia and malaise, 
hence throttling any endeavour at systemic reform.  
Seventh, in spite of their positions as dominant parties, UMNO and LDP allow 
opposition challenges to filter through the political system not merely as ‘fronts’ to legitimise 
authoritarian politics.26 Eighth, the support base for both UMNO and LDP is situated in rural 
constituencies, thus giving rise to such neo-patrimonialistic practices as dispensation of 
patronage, clientilism and pork barrel politics. Although winds of change have been 
observable in Japan since the 2009 elections which saw LDP losing its safe rural base to DPJ, 
observers tend to view such developments as ephemeral.27 Finally, despite the association of 
UMNO and LDP party-states with an agenda full of ‘menus of manipulation’, both are still 
distinguished by a cohesive organisational structure, an uncanny ability to accommodate 
motley demands and an amazing perseverance in clinging to power, admittedly assisted by 
disarray in the opposition forces. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://aliran.com/archives/highi9911a.html; Khoo Boo Teik, ‘Look, who's afraid of a second coalition?’, 
Malaysiakini, 25 February 2001, 
http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/1047 (both accessed 11 October 2012). 
25 Lee Poh Ping, ‘'Japan Incorporated' And Its Relevance To Malaysia’, in Jomo K.S. (ed.), Mahathir Economic 
Policies (Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 1988), pp. 35-37. 
26 William Case, ‘Umno Paramountcy: A Report on Single-Party Dominance in Malaysia’, Party Politics, 2, no. 
1 (1996), p. 116. 
27 See Steven Reed, ‘New ballgame in politics’, The Oriental Economist, October 2009, p. 9.  
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In all the afore-mentioned comparisons, the underlying factor giving them symbiotic 
dimensions is the penetration of party politics in the bilateral relationship between Japan and 
Malaysia. Literature on Malaysia’s Look East Policy (LEP), written from myriad aspects, has 
so far failed to factor in how connections between UMNO and LDP have had any impact on 
Malaysia – Japan bilateral relations.28 Mahathir, for instance, had implicitly utilised LDP for 
the purpose of ideological consolidation. His platform was an understanding he developed 
with the influential former LDP parliamentarian, Shintaro Ishihara, who is also former mayor 
of Tokyo. Through their jointly authored book The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss The 
Coming Century (1995), both leaders are insistent that the authoritarian dimension in Asian 
Values can triumph over Western ideas. The Mahathir–Ishihara collaboration was outstanding 
in many senses. Ishihara is well-remembered for his controversial and ultra-nasionalist views 
at both domestic and international levels. Mahathir had in the formative stage of his political 
career already been branded a Malay ultra-nasionalist. While his overall stance had indeed 
been moderated during his tenure as Prime Minister, his rightist ideas kept cropping up in his 
pro-Bumiputera economic policies and his avowed aversion of the political reformation 
foregrounded following his retirement in 2003. 
Apart from that, official visits by both Malaysian and Japanese leaders would also be 
conventionally accompanied by ‘party delegations’ from BN component parties and LDP.29 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the BN-UMNO led government sometimes could not hide its 
preferences pertaining to the ruling government in Japan. In 2000, Malaysian Foreign 
Minister Syed Hamid Albar frankly admitted, in commenting on LDP’s victory then: 
                                                          
28 Some important literature on the LEP are Jomo K.S., The Sun Also Sets: Lessons from Looking East (Petaling 
Jaya: INSAN, 1983); Lim Hua Sing, ‘Japanese Perspectives on Malaysia's "Look East" Policy’, Southeast Asian 
Affairs (1984), pp. 231-245; Kit G. Machado, ‘Malaysian Cultural Relations With Japan and South Korea in The 
1980s: Looking East’, Asian Survey, 27, no. 6 (1987), pp. 638-660; Khadijah Khalid and Lee Poh Ping, Whither 
the Look East Policy (Bangi: Penerbit UKM, 2003). 
29 ‘Japan’s LDP representatives pay courtesy call on Ting’, The Star, 30 August 2001. 
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We are very happy with the result of the election. I think they have chosen, once again, 
in the true tradition of Japanese who opt for stability and continuity…Our leaders are 
very familiar, very close with the Japanese leadership.30 
 
We are not postulating here a tangential change in Malaysia–Japan relations as a 
consequence of LDP’s downfall in 2009. As with LDP’s earlier defeat in 1993, relations 
forged on a state to state basis are hardly interrupted with the passing of baton from one ruling 
party to another. For instance, tangible collaborative institutions such as the Malaysian Japan 
International Institute of Technology (MJIIT) programme cement Japan’s affirmation to raise 
cooperation with Malaysia via the LEP. We merely propose that insofar as extant political 
variables are concerned, symbiosis in relations between both countries are more conspicuous 
during LDP’s regime. 
 
LDP’S DOWNFALL AND UMNO’S EMPLOYMENT OF LESSONS 
This section looks in more detail at how LDP’s fall from power was made a landmark 
event by UMNO in its application of political lessons. We shall focus more on LDP’s most 
recent setback in 2009, even though we also intermittently consider lessons to be learnt from 
LDP’s earlier removal from power in 1993. This is in line with the scholarly perception that 
more recent events produce powerful predispositions with greater impact. 31  We have 
discerned 16 lessons that UMNO and its supporters have employed, as enumerated and 
detailed in Table 1. The following discussion elaborates seven misconceptions pertaining to 
UMNO’s application of political lessons from LDP’s downfall in Japan. 
 
                                                          
30  ‘Most Southeast Asian gov'ts welcome LDP win’, Kyodo News International, 26 June 2000, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Most+Southeast+Asian+gov'ts+welcome+LDP+win.-a063141546 (accessed 18 
November 2011). 
31 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 269. 
11 
 
No. Item Lessons Number of 
Citations 
Figures & Individuals32 
1 Japan changes more easily due to greater 
homogeneity of its society. If translated into 
the Malaysian context, Malays will 
encounter problems and the post of Prime 
Minister might fall into non-Malay hands 
5 Noh Omar (May 2000), 33 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (May 
2008), 34  Mohd Khuzairi Ismail 
(September 2009),35 Zaidi Muda 
(September 2009), 36  Daim 
Zainuddin (March 2012)37 
2.  The need to steer away from factionalism 
and intra-political rivalry 
4 Mahathir Mohamad 
(November 1994),38 Najib Razak 
(May 2010), 39  Mustafa Kamal 
Yusoff (October 2010), 40  Najib 
Razak (November 2011)41 
3.  That an independence party may still be 
rejected despite having done many good 
deeds 
4 Rosol Wahid (September 
2009),42 Zaidi Muda (September 
2009),43 
Mohamad Annuar Arifin 
(January 2010), 44  Najib Razak 
(November 2011)45 
4 The pre-requisite of eradicating patronage 
politics, cronyism, corruption, scandals and 
3 Isa Samad (June 1997), 46 
Abdullah Badawi (October 
                                                          
32 At times, each individual may present more than one different lesson. 
33 ‘Rope in ACA, police to combat money politics’, New Straits Times, 13 May 2000. Noh Omar is presently 
Minister of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry. 
34 ‘Ku Li: Umno is here to stay’, Sunday Star, 11 May 2008. Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah a former UMNO Vice-
President and long-time Member of Parliament for Gua Musang, Kelantan. 
35 Mohd Khuzairi Ismail, ‘Revolusi Politik Jepun’ [Japan’s Political Revolution], Utusan Malaysia, 4 September 
2009. Mohd Khuzairi is a journalist for Utusan Malaysia, the UMNO- linked newspaper which also functions as 
the main platform for party conservatives to air their views. 
36 Zaidi Muda, ‘Mari kita pakat fikir weh’ [Let us think together], 4 September 2009, 
http://zaidimuda.blogspot.jp/2009/09/mari-kita-pakat-fikir.html (accessed 12 September 2012). Zaidi Muda is 
Development Officer for the state constituency of Bukit Payung, Marang, Terengganu. 
37 ‘Daim warns Chinese voters of risks of their choice’, 21 March 2012, 
http://www.thesundaily.my/news/327027 (accessed 25 July 2012) Daim Zainuddin was Malaysia’s Minister of 
Finance during Mahathir’s era. 
38 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘Ucapan Dasar Perhimpunan Agung UMNO 1994’ [Keynote Address to the 1994 UMNO 
General Assembly], 18 November 1994, http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?m=p&p=mahathir&id=746 (accessed 
18 October 2012). 
39 ‘It’s not the time to relax, says Najib’, 12 May 2010, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/5/12/nation/6243577&sec=nation (accessed 23 February 2012). 
40 ‘Jangan jadi seperti parti LDP di Jepun’ [Don’t be like LDP in Japan], Utusan Malaysia, 22 October 2010. 
Mustafa Kamal Yusof is UMNO Youth Chief of Seputeh, Kuala Lumpur. 
41 ‘Full transcript of Bernama interview with Najib’, 27 November 2011, 
http://www.mysinchew.com/node/66974 (accessed 11 January 2012). 
42 Rosol Wahid, ‘Merdeka Ke 52…Dan Tumbangnya LDP Jepun’ [52nd Independence Anniversary… And LDP 
Falls in Japan], 2 September 2009, http://drosol.com/?p=128 (accessed 13 March 2012). Rosol Wahid is former 
UMNO Secretary of Terengganu. 
43  Zaidi Muda, ‘Mari kita pakat fikir weh’ [Let us think together]. 
44 Mohamad Annuar Arifin, ‘Anwar, 2011, 1511 dan Sejarah Melayu’ [Anwar, 2011, 1511 and the Malay 
Annals], 19 January 2010, http://pemudaumnolarut.blogspot.jp/2010/01/anwar-2011-1511-dan-sejarah-
melayu.html (accessed 6 October 2012). Mohamad Annuar Arifin is UMNO Youth Chief of Larut, Perak. 
45 ‘Full transcript of Bernama interview with Najib’. 
46 ‘Usah guna parti untuk kekayaan diri’ [Don’t use the party to enrich oneself], Berita Harian, 30 June 1997. Isa 
Samad, a former UMNO Vice-President and long-time Chief Minister of Negeri Sembilan (1982-2004), is now 
state legislative assembly member for Bagan Pinang, Negeri Sembilan. 
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money politics 2003),47 Abdul Kadir Jasin (June 
2005)48 
5 The pre-requisite of separating political from 
business relationships which have left 
UMNO under the warlordship of corporate 
figures, marginalising the professionals 
3 Abdullah Badawi (October 
1993),49 Kiau (February 2001),50 
Abdul Kadir Jasin (April 2012)51 
6 The pre-requisite of approaching the people 
and avoiding the sense of arrogance, elitism 
and having lost touch with the grassroots  
3 Mahathir Mohamad 
(September 2009),52 Najib Razak 
(January 2010),53 Ku Seman Ku 
Hussein (May 2012)54 
7 The pre-requisite of prioritising party 
interests rather than those of interest groups 
such as party warlords, king makers and 
power brokers 
3 Abdullah Badawi (October 
2003), 55  Najib Razak (May 
2010), 56  Abdul Kadir Jasin 
(April 2012)57 
8 If change of government or national 
leadership happens more frequently as in 
Japan, the country will face problems in 
continuity of development 
3 Mahathir Mohamad (May 
1997), 58  Mohd Khuzairi Ismail 
(September 2009), 59  Abang 
Johari Openg (April 2011)60 
9 LDP’s downfall confirms UMNO 
paramountcy 
2 Abdullah Badawi (May 1997),61 
Napsiah Omar (June 1997)62 
10 The pre-requisite to reform and not being 2 Najib Razak (May 2010),63 Najib 
                                                          
47 'Pemimpin Perlu Bersih’ [Leaders Must Be Clean], Utusan Malaysia, 9 October 1993. Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi was Prime Minister of Malaysia and UMNO President from 2003 to 2009, and is still Member of 
Parliament for Kepala Batas, Penang. 
48  Abdul Kadir Jasin, ‘Where truth is stranger than fiction’, Malaysian Business, 16 June 2005. Veteran 
journalist and pro-UMNO conservative blogger Abdul Kadir Jasin was Group Editor-in-Chief of New Straits 
Times Press Berhad (1988-2000) and is now Editor-in-Chief of the magazine publishing company, Berita 
Publishing Sdn Bhd. 
49 ‘Pemimpin perlu Bersih’. [Leaders Must Be Clean]. 
50 Kiau, ‘Perihal tok guru dan ahli politik perniagaan’ [On religious gurus and business-based politicians], Berita 
Harian, 4 February 2001. At the time of publication of this article, Kiau was a columnist of the UMNO-linked 
newspaper, Berita Harian. 
51 Abdul Kadir Jasin, ‘Politik Dinasti Semakin Ketara’ [Dynastic Politics Becoming More Obvious], 11 April 
2012, http://kadirjasin.blogspot.jp/2012/04/politik-dinasti-semakin-ketara.html (accessed 27 June 2012). 
52 Mahathir Mohamad, ‘The lesson from Japan’,11 September 2009, http://chedet.cc/blog/?p=319 (accessed 10 
May 2011). 
53 ‘Juara Rakyat Programme Returns To Win People's Heart’, 10 January 2010, 
http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=newslist&news_id=981&news_cat=13&page=1731&sort_year=2010&sort_mo
nth= (accessed 23 November 2011). 
54 Ku Seman Ku Hussein, ‘UMNO dinamik dan tetap relevan’ [UMNO still dynamic and relevant], Utusan 
Malaysia, 13 May 2012. Ku Seman is an Utusan Malaysia reporter. 
55 Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Managing success’, 17 June 2003, 
http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?m=p&p=paklahtpm&id=3256 (accessed 23 April 2009). 
56 ‘It’s not the time to relax, says Najib’. 
57  Abdul Kadir Jasin, ‘Politik Dinasti Semakin Ketara’ [Dynastic Politics Becoming More Obvious]. 
58 ‘I am still here’, 9 May 1997, http://www-cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/97/0509/cs3.html (accessed 13 
March 2012). 
59 Mohd Khuzairi Ismail, ‘Revolusi Politik Jepun’ [Japan’s Political Revolution]. 
60 ‘Hanya kamek layak perintah Sarawak’ [Only we qualify to rule Sarawak], 10 April 2011, 
http://www.bharian.com.my/bharian/articles/HanyakameklayakperintahSarawak_/Sarawak/Praya/article_html 
(accessed 19 June 2012). Abang Johari Openg is Deputy President of the United Heritage Bumiputera Party 
(PBB: Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu), a major BN component party in Sarawak. 
61 ‘Jadikan Umno pilihan muktamad’ [Make UMNO your final choice], Berita Harian, 5 May 1997. 
62 ‘Hayati sejarah demi perpaduan UMNO’ [Internalise history for the sake of UMNO unity], Utusan Malaysia, 
24 June 1997. At the time of giving this speech, Napsiah was national Wanita UMNO Vice-Chief. 
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bound by the old mode of thinking Razak (November 11)64 
11 The need to consolidate party strength by 
practising the concept of party controlling 
the government and by opposing political 
liberalisation 
2 Annuar Musa (2000),65 Mukhriz 
Mahathir (2009)66 
12. The syndrome of hereditary politics which 
obstructs incoming talents and destroys the 
democratic process 
2 Abdul Kadir Jasin (2005)67 
(2012)68 
13 UMNO is seen as risking losing power after 
reaching a fifty-year threshold  
2 Aziz Ishak (2003),69 Mysuara.net 
(2011)70 
14 LDP’s exit from power is seen as ensuing 
from the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) interference, UMNO can thus face a 
similar fate 
1 Abdul Hamid Othman (1999)71 
15 The pre-requisite of main leaders’ listening 
to controversial grassroots requests 
1 Mohd Faizal Ramli (2011)72 
16 The pre-requisite of reducing developmental 
politics 
1 Najib Razak (November 2011)73 
 
Table 1: Lessons applied by UMNO in making sense of LDP’s defeats in 1993 and 2009. 
 
 
1. Fallacious Lessons 
 
 Four lessons are involved here, viz. lessons 9, 11, 14 and 15. In lesson 9, Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, when still UMNO Vice-President in May 1997, had asserted UMNO’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
63 ‘It’s not the time to relax, says Najib’. 
64 ‘Full transcript of Bernama’s interview with Najib’. 
65 ‘Pemimpin MT UMNO Perlu Bersedia Terima Kritikan’ [UMNO Supreme Coucil Members Should Be Ready 
to Accept Criticism], BERNAMA, 12 May 2000. Annuar Musa, at the time of this speech, was chairman of 
UMNO Liaison Committee, Kelantan. 
66  ‘Being Mahathir’s son’, 12 March 2009, http://www.thenutgraph.com/being-mahathirs-son/ (accessed 27 
February 2010). Mukhriz Mahathir, fifth child of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, is currently 
member of Parliament for Jerlun, Kedah, and Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry. 
67 Abdul Kadir Jasin, ‘Where truth is stranger than fiction’. 
68 Abdul Kadir Jasin, ‘Politik Dinasti Semakin Ketara’ [Dynastic Politics Becoming More Obvious]. 
69 Aziz Ishak, ‘Cabaran politik nasional’ [National political challenges], Utusan Malaysia, 1 January 2003. Aziz 
Ishak is presently Editor-in-Chief of the staunchly nationalist daily Utusan Malaysia. 
70 ‘Beware the-curses-of-the-third-generation’, 11 October 2011, http://www.mysuara.net/beware-the-curses-of-
the-third-generation/. Mysuara.net is a pro-government news portal. 
71 ‘Kerajaan memantau ejen kuasa asing’ [Government is monitoring agents of foreign powers], Berita Harian, 3 
May 1999; ‘US bid to recruit 12 as CIA agents’, New Straits Times, 3 May 1999. Abdul Hamid Othman, at the 
time of this speech, was Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department responsible for Islamic affairs. He became 
Religious Advisor to the Prime Minister from 2001 to 2009, and died in December 2011. 
72 ‘DUN Bagan Pinang: Isa calon sesuai, kata Pemuda Umno’ [Bagan Pinang state contituency: Isa is the 
suitable candidate, says UMNO Youth], 23 September 2009 (accessed 12 January 2010), 
http://www.mstar.com.my/berita/cerita.asp?file=/2009/9/23/mstar_berita/20090923133952&sec=mstar_berita. 
Mohd Faizal Ramli is UMNO Youth Chief of Teluk Kemang, Negeri Sembilan. 
73 ‘Serve without expecting a reward, says Najib’, New Straits Times, 9 November 2011. 
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position as one of the world’s primary political parties, following the failure of several parties 
in maintaining their grip on power, referring particularly to the fragmentation of LDP in Japan. 
UMNO’s claim to eminence rests on its protracted capacity of power retention. In a similar 
vein, a month later Napsiah Omar urged UMNO members to prioritise unity, insisting that 
only UMNO among the world’s major parties remain united after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union-led communist bloc and LDP’s defeat in Japan. Both these analogies are no more than 
vain attempts to highlight UMNO’s superiority in public discourse. A lot of dominant parties 
were in fact basking in the heights of power in 1997, such as the People’s Action Party (PAP) 
in Singapore, Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan and even the Communist Party of China (CPC). 
The UMNO spokesmen also apparently forgot that LDP had regained the reins of government 
by the time they made their speeches, notwithstanding the fact that its domination of Japan’s 
political scene was not as all-encompassing as before.  
  In lesson 11, proposals from two UMNO leaders following LDP’s defeat were of 
reactionary rather than progressive quality. First, Annuar Musa, then chairman of the UMNO 
Liaison Committee of Kelantan, speaking in May 2000 in the aftermath of the 10th GE which 
heralded the arrival of an ethnically transcending ‘new politics,’ 74  insisted on UMNO’s 
strengthening the concept of ‘party controlling the government’ as a guarantor of strong 
government. If the party weakens, UMNO may fall in the manner of LDP. This was a 
misleading prescription. In the aftermath of Malaysia’s 10th GE in November 1999, UMNO 
should have loosened its understanding of ‘party controlling the government’ in order to 
regain its much eroded political legitimacy. As Shamsul Amri Baharuddin commented for that 
period, UMNO ought to ‘change substantially, actually reform but they don’t know how’.75 
                                                          
74 Francis Loh Kok Wah and Saravanamuttu, J. (eds).New Politics in Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003). 
75 Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, quoted from ‘Damage Control’, Asiaweek, 17 December 1999, p. 24. 
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As party leader, Mahathir then seemed to acquiesce to Annuar’s suggestion by declining to 
implement reforms and tightening instead democratic space in UMNO.76  
 Like Annuar Musa, Mukhriz Mahathir in March 2009 expressed the ‘scary thought’ 
that UMNO would follow the footsteps of defeated dominant parties such as LDP in the event 
that it resisted change. But at the same time Mukhriz criticised what he characterised as 
‘western thinking’ practised by UMNO. Referring to several attributes of Abdullah Badawi’s 
leadership such as openness and transparency, he regarded them as superfluous as compared 
with the need for economic and political stability. In fearing UMNO’s loss of power but 
retaining a measure of discomfort against political reform, Mukhriz was almost dabbling in 
political non sequitor. To UMNO conservatives, the idea that no alternative to internal reform 
existed if UMNO were to have any reasonable chance of retaining power in a democratic 
environment boosted by advances in information and communications technology (ICT), was 
slow to sink in. It was precisely the two democratically appealing changes advocated by 
Abdullah which had incited vehement opposition from conservative UMNO diehards.  
  In lesson 14, Abdul Hamid Othman declared in May 1999 that the government was 
keeping close tabs on a few individuals suspected of being CIA agents out to destroy Muslim 
unity in Malaysia. He clarified that, being in fifth place in the list of the world’s longest 
serving ruling party, UMNO had become the target of USA after the fall of LDP and India’s 
Congress Party. His allegations were formed upon the background of increasing American 
support being thrown behind former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s reformation 
movement, as visibly demonstrated by Vice President Al Gore’s open advocacy of the cause 
during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Kuala Lumpur in November 
1998. Abdul Hamid’s extravagant claims portrayed that parties such as LDP and India’s 
                                                          
76 William Case, ‘Malaysia's General Elections in 1999: A Consolidated and High-Quality Semi-Democracy,’ 
Asian Studies Review, 25, no. 1 (2001), pp. 35–55. 
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Congress Party had fallen as a consequence of USA’s interference in the internal affairs of 
Japan and India rather than their democratic norms. We could not find any academic evidence 
that support this contention. While it was true that there arose revelations in 1994 that the CIA 
was embroiled in espionage activities in Japan in the 1950s and 60s, its involvement was 
strictly to expunge LDP from communist influence rather than to bring down the LDP regime 
in any way.77  
 A similar fallacy was committed in lesson 15 through UMNO Youth Chief of Teluk 
Kemang Mohd Faizal Ramli’s statement in September 2009. In backing former UMNO Vice-
President Isa Samad’s candidacy for BN in the forthcoming by-election, Mohd Faizal 
appealed to Isa’s record of party loyalty, downplaying the fact that Isa’s suspension from 
party activities for involvement in money politics had just been lifted. To Mohd Faizal, there 
lurked the fear that UMNO would lose out in the same way as LDP did if it ignored the voice 
of delegates, notwithstanding Mahathir’s unease at the choice of Isa. Yet, Mohd Faizal’s 
analogy, resembling an ’intimidation’ to the party leadership, was grossly out of place. Mohd 
Faizal faulty logic was a typical manifestation of UMNO warlords’ retrogressive thinking 
which contributed to UMNO’s loss of seats due to internal sabotage during the 12th GE. In 
applying such reasoning, he was unwittingly advocating the continual hegemony of warlords 
in UMNO’s decision making, regardless of the reality that it was just such a phenomenon that 
was increasingly alienating UMNO from the masses. 
 
 
2. Lessons in shallow contexts  
 
                                                          
77 ‘C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's’, The New York Times, 9 October 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/09/world/cia-spent-millions-to-support-japanese-right-in-50-s-and-60-s.html 
(accessed 20 September 2012). 
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  Ironically, two lessons applied in shallow contexts are the ones that received the 
highest citations. In both lessons 1 and 8, LDP’s downfall was used to implant the sentiment 
of fear especially among Malays. For advocates of lesson 1, the Japanese were more inclined 
towards change as a consequence of their society’s homogeneous character. If the prevailing 
circumstances in Japan were to be translated into the Malaysian context, Malay political 
problems, or so the argument goes, will multiply to the extent that the post of Prime Minister 
may be lost to non-Malays. Supporters of lesson 8 magnify such sentiments by adding that if 
there were frequent changes of the country’s administration or political leadership as 
obtaining  in Japan,  Malaysia’s development process will be regularly truncated. Inculcation 
of the culture of fear had indeed been UMNO’s popular weapon for time immemorial. 
Mahathir himself had alluded to the longevity of LDP’s rule to justify his protracted hold on 
power. To him, too frequent a change in the Premiership as has happened under LDP may 
potentially hand over the driving seat of managing the nation to unelected civil servants. Yet, 
such logic was arguably flawed. In Japanese politics, placing trust in the bureaucracy had 
never come close to devolving decision-making power to bureaucrats, who were by and large 
still bound to political conventions and norms of the ruling party.78 
  Lesson 3, referring to the fact that an independence party may still be rejected despite 
having done many good deeds, is the second highest employed by UMNO. This argument 
seems to imply repayment of good deeds of a party which grew out of the independence 
movement by voting it into power Yet, the question arises as to how long such a repayment 
should continue, and what if the party reneges on its promises to continually repay the 
people’s trust in them via even nobler deeds. Ever since securing the position of the most 
                                                          
78  Cf. Michio Muramatsu, ‘Post-war Politics in Japan: Bureaucracy versus the Party/Politics’ in Michio 
Muramatsu and Frieder Naschold (eds), State and Administration in Japan and Germany: A Comparative 
Perspective on Continuity and Change (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1996), p. 14; Jose Antonio Crespo, 
‘The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan: Conservative Domination’,  International Political Science Review, 16, 
no. 2 (1995), p. 201. 
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pivotal playmakers of Malaysian politics, BN and UMNO have incessantly resorted to the 
narrow rhetoric of the moral obligation of repaying their good deeds at the ballot box. Such a 
rhetoric was particularly psychologically powerful within the context of a Malay-Muslim 
audience. Yet, even the appeal of similar rhetoric had significantly waned among the LDP 
rank and file. For example, amidst much speculation of an impending LDP defeat in 2009, 
LDP Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda was still heard appealing to the ‘good deeds’ 
rhetoric to persuade the Japanese to retain the status quo.79 Interestingly, Rosol Wahid, an 
upholder of such rhetoric, relates:  
I chatted with adoloscents and youngsters… why they lack gratefulness to the 
government which had done many good deeds to them…their answers are similar and 
consistent…‘building roads, schools, bridges and improving infrastructure…those are 
duties and obligations of the government anyway’. In Korea, they say, the government 
does what BN implements in Malaysia. Even on a grander scale…and so does the 
Japanese government which has just lost power [in 2009]… And similarly with the 
Chinese government…What we seek now are leaders who have integrity, are 
trustworthy and can ‘get along’… 
 
3. Deficit between lesson and implementation 
 
The first example in this context, lesson 16, refers to the requisite of reducing 
dependence on developmental politics ala-LDP, as reminded by Prime Minister Najib Razak 
in November 2011. Politics of development takes place when equally competing parties retain 
significant support in rural areas by offering and trading development projects in exchange of 
votes. In the 1970s, LDP under Kakuei Tanaka enacted this strategy as an important strategy 
which contributed in no small measure to the expansion of pork barrel and patronage 
politics.80 In UMNO’s case, Mahathir’s enthusiastic embrace of developmental politics has 
                                                          
79  ‘INTERVIEW - Japan's LDP fears voter frenzy for change’, 14 August 2009, 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/8/14/worldupdates/2009-08-
14T145815Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-417580-2&sec=Worldupdates (accessed 14 June 2010). 
80 Chalmers Johnson, ‘Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan’, 
Journal of Japanese Studies, 12,  no. 1 (1986), pp. 1-28. 
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been much documented. Josh Hong, an alternative media columnist in Malaysia and 
University of London graduate, asserted Malaysia’s position as ‘a state under construction’ 
under Mahathir’s leadership: 
 
New buildings were mushrooming regardless of their eventual occupancy, while 
contracts were constantly being churned out by Umno to plaster the country with roads, 
highways and bridges to nowhere. Perhaps I should also mention bus stops that no 
buses pass by. This was exactly how the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been 
ruling Japan until it was routed in the general election last September…For years, 
Mahathir was fascinated by the LDP’s firm hold on power, and secretly hoped to 
replant the model in Malaysia. His party ended up exactly where the LDP has been 
over the last few decades: plagued with cronyism and factionalism.81 
 
Hence, although Najib deserves credit for openly admonishing such Mahathir-like 
prescriptions, we ought to be mindful that this lesson scores the lowest frequency with only 
one citation. Such a situation is understandable in view of the embeddeness of such practices 
within the whole range of  UMNO’s strategy. More importantly, Najib seems to have 
forgotten to acknowledge that the continual prevalence of patronage politics in UMNO 
remains a bane to the party. A fortnight after LDP’s downfall, Malaysian financial analyst 
Cheong Khuat Hock wrote in the mainstream newspaper The Star on the imperative of 
Malaysia’s learning from the failures of LDP’s policies in Japan. Among issues which Khuat 
Hock touched on was the utilisation of fiscal stimulus to revive the economy. As he saw it, 
such an approach was ineffective, being more of a means to reward cronies. The LDP 
government had employed it to benefit its allies in the construction and rural sectors. In 
consequence, Japan’s ratio of government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 
60% in 1990 to 182% in 2008. Detecting worrying parallels with the case of Malaysia, 
leading to increasing deficits since 1998, Choong questioned the wisdom behind the need for 
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such new mega projects as the RM12 billion double tracking railway from Ipoh to Thailand 
and the fast speed railway from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. 82 Points raised by Choong 
highlighted Japan’s main problems under LDP’s leadership. Between 1992 and 2002, Japan 
launched 18 different stimulus packages, all of which failed to engender novel ideas and 
ended up as financial waste.83 LDP frequently thought that monetary stimulus would cure 
economic problems and act as a primary prescription in structural reform. In fact, it could at 
best function as a pain-killing ‘morphin’, a far cry from being a remedy which  necessitated a 
‘surgery’.84 
 This lesson entangles Najib and UMNO in a dilemma, for they seemingly still hold to 
the belief that patronage politics is essential to maintain support. It has been argued that 
‘patronage-based strategies aimed at staying in power can turn over time into a boomerang by 
undermining the cohesion, the principles, the autonomy, the flexibility, and finally the ability 
of parties to win votes’.85 Najib’s reluctance to address this malaise has been accentuated by 
his continual reliance on developmental politics on an even larger scale as the 13th GE 
looming. Not only has he assented to the erection of another sky-scraper in the Warisan 
Merdeka edifice, but Najib has also rebranded the Tun Razak Exchange to the value of RM25 
billion. On a more populist note, Najib keeps on promising the people with attractive financial 
goodies of short-term utility. It seems that when Najib pointed to LDP’s failure to struggle for 
the people (lesson 6), he was advocating solutions through the more conventional formula of 
                                                          
82 Cheong Khuat Hock, ‘Look East no more?’, 14 September 2009, 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/9/14/business/4701178&sec=business (accessed 14 October 
2012) 
83 Takashi Yokota, ‘How Koizumi Did In The LDP’, 14 August 2009, 
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showering them with material development rather than pursuing a more holistic development 
agenda. 
 In the same vein, lesson 10, referring to the urgency for reform without being tied to 
the old mode of thinking, has twice been voiced out by Najib. Credit is due to him for his 
candid call to re-examine aversion to reform which became widespread during the twilight 
years of Abdullah Badawi’s era. Najib has admittedly accomplished few reforms such as the 
abolition of the Internal Security Act (ISA) and loosening of political controls. As the leader 
who can merely speak out for reform, whether he can engineer the adaptation of a new 
political culture in UMNO is speculative if not the product of wishful thinking. We take for 
instance Tamura’s reminder to UMNO on the need to be receptive to the media. In his speech 
as quoted by Berita Harian, Tamura stressed: 
 
Frequent political changes in Japan owe to the media’s role in too actively conducting 
polls on the internet such that leaders have had to resign for failing to perform. 
However, we steadfastly hold on to him as the size of readership and votes serve as 
early indicators of early elections.86 
 
In view of Tamura’s statement, media freedom, although frowned upon in Japan, 
remains reliable as a source of electoral analysis. For example, imminent losses to be 
conceded by LDP in 1993 and 2009 were so masterfully predicted by the Japanese newspaper 
polls.87 In Malaysia, the state consistently cold-shoulders such opinion polls, exhibiting the 
denial syndrome. The state is willing to pay heed only to conformist polls, as presented by 
institutions, academicians and think tanks willing to toe the establishment’s line. Whenever 
results of polls conducted by independent bodies are released, the state shows contradictory 
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reactions. If the outcome favours the government, the mainstream media will give wide 
coverage of the polls. If negative results are otherwise publicised, the polls’ legitimacy will be 
greatly questioned by the state on multiple excuses.88 More surprisingly, during the Bersih 3.0 
street gathering to demand electoral reform in April 2012, media personnel from progressive 
news agencies were roughed up by the police. 
 
4. Overgeneralised lessons 
 
  The second highest lesson employed by UMNO revolved around the issue of 
factionalism, also twice mentioned by Najib Razak in his rationalisation of LDP’s exit from 
power. Whilst advocates of lesson 2 are crystal clear on factionalism as a scourge which could 
potentially bring about UMNO’s downfall, the whole question seems to have been 
overgeneralised to the extent of factionalism becoming UMNO members’ favoured escapist 
explanation in lieu of addressing more fundamental problems affecting the party.  
  Academically speaking, factionalism is inevitable in most political parties of modern 
democracies.89 The reformist-inclined Abdullah Badawi himself conceded that factionalism 
within UMNO had become a normal manifestation of internal politicking along the lines of 
LDP.90 But the character of factionalism could be ascertained as to whether it was competitive, 
cooperative or degenerative. 91  Whether in UMNO or LDP, degenerative factionalism is 
conducive to more serious crises. LDP’s setbacks in 1993 and 2009 owed in part to 
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factionalism, 92  as was the case with UMNO’s internal infighting in 1987 and 1998. 
Nonetheless, in LDP’s case, factionalism was far from extraordinary, being the outcome of 
Japan’s system of single-non transferable vote (STNV) which encourages intra-party 
competition (before changing to the mixed member system in 1994). More importantly, 
factionalism within LDP also functioned as a check and balance on prime ministerial power 
and thus bolstered political accountability.93 
  In UMNO’s case, the claim of wanting to rid UMNO of factionalism can be disputed 
as its top lieutenants are themselves factional leaders, including Najib Razak. A more 
practical exhortation would be for UMNO’s factionalism to acquire the cooperative or 
competitive spirit. What we see now is UMNO’s intra-elite conflicts assuming degenerative 
character. Mahathir, notwithstanding his own reminder in 1994 of the dangers of  factionalism 
to the party, himself fell victim to it when orchestrating his tirade against Abdullah Badawi in 
2006. Not only did he emerge as Abdullah’s most vicious critic, but Mahathir also played the 
role of factional king maker among UMNO conservatives to demand his successor’s 
resignation. Far from showcasing statesmanlike qualities, Mahathir behaved in the manner of 
the Shadow Shogun popular in LDP politics, as had been done by the likes of Tanaka Kakuie 
and Ichiro Ozawa among others. 
  A most important lesson that UMNO should learn is located in the sphere of politics – 
business connections, in which there exists striking parallels between it and LDP. The level of 
factionalism in UMNO is closely related to its ability to eradicate corruption and money 
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politics. Scholars agree that factionalism in UMNO worsened as a direct consequence of its 
serious involvement in business.94 But only three citations are recorded for lesson 5. The 
failure to separate political from business-based relationships has resulted in effective control 
of UMNO falling into the hands of corporate warlords, relegating professionals to the 
periphery. 
 
5. The ‘Santayana’s aphorism must be reversed’ syndrome and contextual 
mistakes  
 
 
The depraved linkages between politics and business, identified by many as UMNO’s 
gravest ailment in recent times, have been blamed for the diffusion of lessons 4 and 7: the 
spread of patronage politics, cronyism, corruption and money politics, and the penetration of 
iniquitous warlords, king makers and power brokers into UMNO’s leadership. The solitary 
UMNO leader to have paid any serious attention to these lessons, Abdullah Badawi – as 
expressed in 1993 well before becoming President, fits unfortunately into the ‘Santayana’s 
aphorism must be reversed’ syndrome. Taking over the stewardship of UMNO in 2003, 
Abdullah’s attempt to distance himself from nefarious elements creeping into UMNO was 
short-lived. Within a few years, his administration was marred by allegations implicating his 
family members such as his son Kamaluddin, son-in-law-cum-UMNO Youth chief  Khairy 
Jamaluddin, and close confidante Kalimullah Hassan with numerous dubious business 
wheeling and dealing. These contributed to the deficit perception of his leadership during the 
12th GE in 2008.95 Another example, Isa Samad, had reminded UMNO members in June 
1997 to not turn UMNO into a money-making enterprise if they were to avoid imitating 
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LDP’s fate, only to be suspended from the party in 2005 after being found guilty of money 
politics during the previous year’s hustings for party Vice-Presidency, which Isa won with the 
highest vote.  
In this regard, scholars have noted that frequent misapplication of lessons takes place 
when politicians periodically get drawn into the pitfall of myopically applying lessons based 
on observable variables surrounding their own circumstances and experiences. In Abdullah’s 
example above, his heeding the lesson of separating politics from business was influenced by 
his own bid for UMNO’s Vice-Presidency in 1993. Upon losing to candidates representing 
the ‘Vision Team’ led by aspirant for Deputy President Anwar Ibrahim, Abdullah heaped 
blame on money politics for eroding his support.96 Anwar was then infamous for having 
spread his political influence throughout UMNO’s network by implanting his proxies in the 
corporate sector, the media and think tanks.97 Hence, although Abdullah’s lesson was genuine, 
he might well have been influenced by his own circumstances, relatively isolated from the 
rough and tumble of realpolitik, corporate wire pulling and mainstream media reporting. 
 Long-standing UMNO numero uno Mahathir Mohamad was also guilty of 
contextually misapplying political lessons. Five days after LDP’s downfall in 2009, Mahathir 
wrote an article on ‘the lesson from Japan’. He regarded the beating experienced by LDP as 
proof that the populace are becoming increasingly nonchalant about the sacrifices of 
independence or heritage parties. But rather than castigating the whole of UMNO’s 
degenerative political culture as the cause of its decline, Mahathir focused instead on his 
successor Abdullah Badawi’s shortcomings in allowing graft-ridden mores to take hold in 
UMNO. He  pin-pointed for instance Abdullah’s alleged use of RM250 billion of the national 
oil company PETRONAS’s income with hardly any tangible returns. Yet, it is widely 
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accepted that UMNO’s corruption-ridden culture had been ingrained during Mahathir’s era, 
and it was on the promise to eradicate corruption that Abdullah achieved the biggest ever 
mandate by an incumbent Prime Minister in 2004. When Abdullah fell several steps behind in 
this direction, his electoral fortunes were dramatically reversed in 2008. 
 Veteran journalist and pro-UMNO blogger Abdul Kadir Jasin is similarly guilty of 
contextual flaw in his personal reflection below:  
 
In the 1980s, I visited the headquarters of the LDP in Tokyo. LDP was then ruling 
Japan. During the visit, I met Tsutomu Hata who was given the task of reforming LDP 
or Jiminto in Japanese. Hata told me that LDP had become increasingly feudalistic, 
money-orientated and controlled by big business. He was tasked with reforming LDP 
in line with changes in contemporary Japan. Hata’s efforts, however, were defeated by 
LDP “warlords”. As Prime Minister later, his administration lasted only nine weeks. In 
2009, LDP lost the general elections after ruling for 54 years. In our country, similar 
circumstances are becoming more evident. Political parties are becoming more 
feudalistic, nepotisme is more widespread and political dynasties are tightening their 
grip.98 
 
Abdul Kadir, however, was reluctant to dissect UMNO’s predicament in a more 
incisive manner. Surprisingly, he thereafter rambles on about rumours surrounding Rosmah 
Mansor, Najib Razak’s influential wife. His implicating UMNO’s present malaise with 
dynastic tendencies observable among UMNO’s top leadership echelon masks the more 
pivotal issue of politics– business nexuses which themselves give rise to the phenomena of 
warlords and nepotism. Rather than using Hata’s case to contextualise UMNO’s main 
problem, he limited his analysis to justify his personal criticisms. Other than the fact that 
Abdul Kadir is long known as a stern critic of Abdullah Badawi, he was also embroiled in 
business-based politics as Anwar Ibrahim’s man during the latter’s effective takeover of the 
New Straits Times Press in   1994.99 
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6. Neglecting more fundamental lessons 
 
Apart from careless oversight of politics – business intertwining connections, UMNO 
has also been wont to neglect two other pressing problems, viz. hereditary politics and the 
inability to attract leaders from the younger generation. In this regard, lesson 12 has only two 
citations, provided by Abdul Kadir Jasin in 2005 and 2012. His lapse in 2012 has been 
explained above. In a previous article of 2005, Abdul Kadir sought to explain UMNO’s 
democratic deficit, as shown by the lack of competition during party elections in 2004, as 
reflective of family-based politics intruding into UMNO (most controversial was when 
Abdullah’s ambitious son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin, being elected unopposed to the position 
of UMNO Youth deputy chief). 
 Regardless of Abdul Kadir’s contextual mistakes, his analysis of hereditary politics 
in UMNO has its own merits. Hereditary politics has been virtually synonymous with LDP 
politics. In 2011, an analysis showed that nearly 40% of LDP members were hereditary 
politicians. This syndrome deprived LDP of new ideas as kanban (name recognition) factored 
significantly for an aspiring politician to climb the party hierarchy.100 While the hereditary 
politics syndrome in UMNO is not as chronic as in LDP, its prevalence at important decision-
making levels does give UMNO a lackadaisical image. According to Nik Nazmi, a young 
budding politician from PR, one of the most vital lessons of DPJ’s triumph in Japan is the 
urgency of offering to the public youthful and energetic figures whose constant emergence 
prevents a party from degenerating into regressive dynasties. 101  Such a scenario is also 
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captured by the PAP in Singapore. In a speech in 2010, its Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 
himself son of former Premier Lee Kuan Yew, presented for his party colleagues’ reference 
the cases of LDP and UMNO as two dominant parties currently in crisis mode. LDP, he 
argued, has declined due not only to economic stagnation, but also because of its failure to 
engineer self-renewal and attract new talents in the midst rampant dynastic politics.102  
 In the light of LDP’s downfall in Japan, hardly any senior UMNO leader has 
dwelled upon the importance of enticing young upstarts as an early measure to avoid UMNO 
deteriorating into a collection of dynastic families ala-LDP. As it stands, there are simply too 
many bottlenecks in the way of aspiring young politicians to rise through UMNO’s hierarchy. 
Abdullah Badawi had probably an inkling of what was required to arrest UMNO’s decline, 
hence his bringing in a coterie of young advisors led by Khairy Jamaluddin into his policy-
making team. Notwithstanding the controversy which erupted as a result of such individuals’ 
abrupt rise to power, their presence gave some important theoretical dimensions to the 
reformist endeavours of Abdullah Badawi’s era.103 Abdullah’s political guru, Musa Hitam, 
former Deputy Prime Minister (1981-1986) before his fallout with Mahathir, is another 
UMNO veteran who is aware of the party’s shortcomings in this sphere. A widely respected 
figure ever since steadfastly sticking to his principles at the cost of antagonising Mahathir in 
the mid-1980s, Musa has often cautioned UMNO that continual hold on power could only 
come about if it were willing and able to stoop, befriend and welcome promising youngsters 
with open arms.104 
 
7. Not heeding enough lessons from LDP reformist leader Junichiro 
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Koizumi’s successful reformation programme  
 
In April 2001, the reform-minded and relatively young Junichiro Koizumi was elected 
as Japanese Prime Minister. Not only did he rely on a group of well-educated, eloquent and 
media-savvy LDP Young Turks to carry his reform mission, but he also pledged to ‘change 
LDP’ in his goal to ‘transform Japan’. LDP’s conservative doyen and close friend of Mahathir 
Mohamad, Shintaro Ishihara surprised friends and foes alike by backing Koizumi’s efforts, 
which he deemed as the only available way left to save Japan. So popular was Koizumi during 
the early phase of his administration that his approval rating reached a staggering 90%.105 Far 
from treating Koizumi’s support from his fellow Japanese as a lesson in rehabilitating 
political legitimacy of UMNO after 1999 general election, Mahathir by and large ignored 
such warning signs to the detriment of UMNO’s posterity.  
It was left to Mahathir’s handpicked successor, Abdullah Badawi, to attempt to reform 
UMNO ala-Koizumi. Five months before assuming the coveted Premiership in November 
2003, Abdullah again referred to problems besetting LDP such as scandals, corruption and 
power brokering. Distancing himself from excesses of Mahathir’s era, Abdullah recruited 
young, highly educated, eloquent and media-friendly upstarts as trusted advisors in his quest 
for reformation. A promising first few months, even if only declaratory and aspirational in 
character, were sufficient to convince Malaysians to deliver BN an overwhelming mandate of 
64% of popular votes and 91% of parliamentary seats in the 11th GE of March 2004. 
Nevertheless, as time passed, most of Abdullah’s reform programme elicited stiff opposition 
from the UMNO warlords. These included the proposal for the establishment of an 
Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC), large-scale war 
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against money politics and relaxation of the political system. The overturning of Anwar 
Ibrahim’s conviction for sodomy in 2004 and his subsequent release from jail worried 
conservatives who felt threatened by the loosening of party controls over government. 
Abdullah, disappointingly, relented to such pressures. In April 2007, a commentator using the 
pseudonym ‘LKS’, believed to be DAP supremo Lim Kit Siang, noted: 
 
When ABB [sic] won the last election, I thought at the time that he had a lot of 
similarity [sic] with Japan former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi was 
elected on massive public support for his political reform against the will of his own 
ruling party, LDP, which like UMNO, has been the ruling party of Japan since the 
World War 2. He promised to fight against money politic, construction industry pump-
priming that helps its owned [sic] supporters etc. During his time at the office, he 
faced much resistance from its own party but he always managed to “go to the people” 
and even threathen [sic] to campaign against his own party. Japanese people were 
charmed and re-elected him again with another landslide.106 
 
‘LKS’’s comparison between Koizumi and Abdullah Badawi was more attuned with 
reality. In order to ensure success of his reform programme, not only did Koizumi fill his 
cabinet with reform-minded politicians – action which Abdullah failed to do – but also 
dismissed opponents to reform as in his privatisation of Japan Post. Koizumi exploited the 
new media to the fullest to maintain popularity and warm voters’ hearts to win a second term 
– no mean feat in Japanese politics. 107  Abdullah and his administrative colleagues’ 
unwarranted hostility against the new media, on the other hand, practically cost them the 12th 
GE – the slender majority providing ammunition to Abdullah’s adversaries within UMNO.108 
During his first press conference following the 12th GE political tsunami, Abdullah 
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retorted:‘We must learn from this [verdict]. I have always believed there are lessons to learn. 
Even in the worst of tragedies, there are lessons to be learned’.109 Abdullah consequently tried 
to prove himself as a man of lessons. He awarded hefty ex gratia payments to judges sacked 
by Mahathir during the judicial crisis of 1988, inducted the critical voices of Zaid Ibrahim, 
Shahrir Samad and Saifuddin Abdullah into the cabinet and pledged to accomplish his final 
institutional reforms, viz. the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the 
Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC).  
Yet, the one year between BN and UMNO’s disastrous performance in March 2008 
and Abdullah Badawi’s handover of power to Najib Razak in April 2009 was a period of lame 
duck Premiership for Abdullah. Amidst incessant calls to hasten Abdullah’s relinquishment of 
the UMNO presidency, party warlords manouevred to water down both his reformist legacies, 
viz. the MACC and JAC. Backed by Mahathir, conservatives led by Muhyiddin Yassin 
pressured Abdullah to fast-track his transfer of power to Najib. As with ‘LKS’, Malaysia’s 
foremost Chinese language newspaper Sin Chew Jit Poh commented; ‘He should look past 
UMNO and go to the people. The people would back him and the result would be 
different’. 110  The whole episode of Abdullah’s eventual ouster was a pitiful case of not 
heeding enough lessons from Koizumi’s reform trajectory. He recognised the loophole and 
tried to emulate the early phase of Koizumi’s lesson, but as Abdullah himself later confessed, 
he forgot its more important application of steadfastly upholding reformist principles and 
remaining in full control of the reformation scheme.111  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is an understatement to say that lessons which UMNO applied or rather misapplied 
with respect to LDP were merely rituals. Because of the cordial relationship between both 
countries, tragedy befalling Japan’s dominant party was bound to affect its Malaysian 
equivalent in no uncertain terms. Our analysis, however, suggests that politicians are inclined 
to apply political lessons in a most skewed manner, bearing a slew of misconceptions. A 
variety of implications therefore arise. In UMNO’s case, notwithstanding calls from within 
the party to always learn from the past, a weak application of historical lessons would 
engender inaccurate trajectory of change so painfully needed of UMNO. Intermittent opinion 
polls during Najib’s tenure indicate that support for his reformation efforts is asymmetrical 
with support for UMNO as the ruling party. In short, UMNO as an institution is seen as too 
embedded with problems inherited from an insidious past for it to effect large-scale reforms 
with minimal internal bottlenecks. The way UMNO adapts to the new environment, engages 
the public and vilifies political adversaries signifies an adamant attachment to the concept of 
‘government knows best’ and to the politics of divide and rule along ethno-religious lines. 
This is given credence by the recent appearance of issues greatly damaging to national unity: 
the ‘cow head’ protest against the relocation of a Hindu temple to a Malay-dominanted 
residential area, the usage of the word ‘Allah’ for God in Malay language Christian 
publications, the government’s heavy-handed action against Bersih 2.0 and 3.0 protestors 
demanding electoral reform, the aggressive approach of Malay supremacist non-governmental 
organisation Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa Malaysia (PERKASA: Society for Empowered 
Indigenous Malaysians) apparently sanctioned by the powers that be and given wide publicity 
by the state-linked mainstream media, and the intimidation tactics employed against trans-
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ethnic human rights organisations such as Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM: Voice of 
Malaysians). 
We do not go so far as to suggest that only UMNO needs to carefully apply lessons 
from LDP’s downfall. The Japanese example, while of significance to Malaysia, cannot be 
pushed too far. In any national context, sui generis factors operate, although the extent and 
timing may vary according to country. It is equally important to ask whether PR can employ 
the lesson from Japan appropriately. While the eclipse of LDP is of great inspirational value 
to PR’s aspiring pretenders to government office, their imitation of DPJ’s success has to be 
piecemeal. DPJ was swept into power on a populist manifesto which pledged to break the  
iron triangle and vested interests prevalent in Japan’s political economy. PR has seemingly 
followed DPJ’s footsteps by offering populist prescriptions such as an attractive minimum 
wage, free education, drastic reduction of car prices and promises of greater structural and 
institutional reform. But DPJ’s record until today remains mixed due to systemic complexities 
involving entrenched interests and institutional resistance to change. Paradoxically, DPJ has 
even begun to implement policies which mirror LDP’s many Achilles' heel, including 
frequency of leadership changes.112 Hence, the widespread speculation of DPJ being trounced 
in Japan’s upcoming elections in December should by itself be taken as a lesson by PR on the 
difficulties of being the incumbent power. Should PR be voted into power in the oncoming 
elections, PR’s trajectory will not be immune from the ‘various LDP lessons’ such as 
corruption, dynastic politics, covert political funds and the nexus of business–politics.113 Even 
before grabbing power at the federal level, some of PR’s state governments have already been 
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riddled by such snags. Whether PR would then also join the list of ‘Santayana’s aphorism 
must be reversed’ remains to be seen.  
 
